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Abstract
Motivated by a substantial number of startup owners with negative household net
worth, I present a model that incorporates credit borrowing into Evans and Jovanovic
[1989]. The estimated model generates no relationship between household wealth and the
propensity for business entry. Ignoring credit borrowing for potential business owners
substantially overstates the efficiency loss from financial constraints in business entry.
However, the efficiency loss in investments by the entrants is large even if credit borrowing
is allowed. Individuals who start a business once credit borrowing is available are those
whose business ideas are of a high-enough quality to compensate high financing costs
associated with credit borrowing. They start a business with a sub-optimal amount of
investments, and those agents’ unrealized investments are considerable.
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1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in entrepreneurial finance is whether financial con-
straints hinder entrepreneurial activities. Most government policies for small businesses are
based on the presumption that financial constraints generate inefficiency in the creation of new
businesses or in the investment by existing businesses. Despite this presumption, the answer
to the above question is still unclear.
On the one hand, many papers argue financial constraints impede entrepreneurial activities,
by showing the propensity to become a business owner is a positive function of household or
personal wealth (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic [1989], Evans and Leighton [1989], Holtz-Eakin
et al. [1994], Fairlie and Krashinsky [2012], Sauer and Wilson [2016]). By exploiting housing
price variations, Corradin and Popov [2015], Adelino et al. [2015], and Schmalz et al. [2017]
draw a similar conclusion. On the other hand, other findings suggest financial constraints are
not empirically important in deterring business formation. For example, Hurst and Lusardi
[2004] document no relationship between household net worth and business entry over the
majority of the wealth distribution, except for the very top. Using a localized housing price
variation, Kerr et al. [2015] argue housing collateral is not a major barrier to entrepreneurship.1
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), I first document that a
substantial number of individuals with negative household net worth start a business. Their
observable characteristics are similar to, but their log business earnings are greater than,
startup owners with positive and below-median net worth. With additional data sources such
as the Kaufmann Firm Survey (KFS) and the Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS), I show
1In a related view, Robb and Robinson [2014] show startup firms rely heavily on external debt for financing,
which may suggest a well-functioning credit market for business creation.
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credit borrowing is likely to be the main source of financing for those individuals.2 Consistent
with Hurst and Lusardi [2004] and Kerr et al. [2015], this finding may support the view that
household-level net worth is not a major barrier to business creation.
With a high cost associated with credit borrowing, however, whether the entrants are
investing at their optimal scale, especially when they enter with a relatively small amount of
collateral, is not clear. Figure 1 shows the time trend of mortgage and credit card interest
rates between 1996 and 2013.3 For all years, the interest rate for credit borrowing is almost
double the interest rate for mortgage, with the premium for credit borrowing being about 8%.
With this high interest rate premium, individuals with negative net worth, who primarily rely
on credit borrowing for staring a business, may have to pay a high financing cost to start a
business.
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the extent to which financial constraints
hinder business entry and investments by the entrants given that individuals can start a busi-
ness using credit borrowing. To this end, I present and structurally estimate a model of
financial friction that allows individuals without net worth to start a business through credit
borrowing. Using the estimated model, I measure the importance of financial constraints to
business entry and to investments by the entrants. The estimated model implies 1.44% of po-
tential business owners are discouraged to start a business, and 6.07% of potential investments
by the entrants are not realized due to financial constraints.
Many models with financial constraints, for example Evans and Jovanovic [1989], can-
2Related to this finding, Chatterji and Seamans [2012] show an exogenous increase in credit borrowing leads
to an increase in business creation, using a credit card deregulation in the early 1980s in the United States.
3The mortgage rate is a 30-year conventional mortgage rate, which is contract interest rates on commitments
for fixed-rate first mortgages. The credit card interest rate is the commercial bank interest rate on credit card
plans. (Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED))
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not rationalize the behavior of individuals who start a business with negative net worth. In
those models, the amount of borrowing is limited to a proportion of the household net worth.
Therefore, anyone without net worth cannot finance and cannot start a business. I relax this
assumption by incorporating credit borrowing into Evans and Jovanovic [1989]. Individuals
with high entrepreneurial productivity can now start a business through credit borrowing even
without household net worth.
I parsimoniously model a friction in credit borrowing. Following the theoretical findings
on consumer credit (e.g., Chatterjee et al. [2007]), I model the interest rate premium associ-
ated with credit borrowing to be monotonically increasing as the amount of credit borrowing
increases. How fast it is increasing depends on one parameter. The model nests Evans and
Jovanovic [1989] in that if the parameter is zero, the model collapses to Evans and Jovanovic
[1989] without collateral constraints, and if the parameter goes to infinity, the model becomes
Evans and Jovanovic [1989] with collateral constraints. Intuitively, the parameter capturing
the credit-borrowing premium can be identified by the behavior of individuals without net
worth, because collateral constraints do not affect their decision to become a business owner.
The estimated model generates no relationship between household wealth and the propensity
to start a business, as observed in the data.
Using the estimated model, I measure the efficiency loss due to financial constraints. About
15.34% of potential business owners in Evans and Jovanovic [1989] cannot start a business,
whereas 1.44% of them cannot start a business in the current model. This finding suggests
that ignoring the availability of credit borrowing for potential business owners substantially
overstates the efficiency loss from financial constraints in business creation. However, unlike
the efficiency loss in the extensive margin, the efficiency loss in the intensive margin is large
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even if credit borrowing is allowed for potential business owners. For example, about 7.69% of
investments by the entrants are not realized in Evans and Jovanovic [1989], whereas 6.07% of
investments are not realized in the current model.
Many financially constrained agents who cannot start a business in Evans and Jovanovic
[1989] are able to start a business if credit borrowing is available. However, they start a
business with a sub-optimal amount of investments, and those agents’ unrealized investments
are considerable. Individuals who start a business once credit borrowing is available are those
whose business idea is of a high-enough quality to compensate high financing costs associated
with credit borrowing. Those productive agents’ unrealized investments are likely to be higher.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. The model is discussed in
section 3. Section 4 discusses the identification and the estimation of the model. The main
results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Sample Construction
I use the SIPP for this study. The SIPP is a nationally representative household-based survey
of the US population, designed to collect information for income and program participation.
Each panel of the SIPP follows a large number of respondents, ranging from approximately
14,000 to 36,000 for three or four years. I use the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels.4 Due to
the large number of respondents, I can observe a relatively large number of individuals when
they first start a business. The SIPP also provides household-level net worth, one of the most
4I do not include panels before 1996, because the SIPP’s survey design changed before 1996, and some of
the variables before and after 1996 panel are not consistent. Panels after 1996 are not overlapping.
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important variables for this study.
The sample construction is similar to that in the literature (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic
[1989], Hamilton [2000], Hurst and Lusardi [2004]). The main sample is a two-year panel. In
the first year, every individual is a worker. In the second year, some of the workers in the first
period start a business. The SIPP interviews a respondent every four months, and each time,
called a wave, it asks whether the respondent owns a business. A respondent is defined as a
business owner in a given year if he answers yes to the question “Did you own a business?” and
his working hours for the business are greater than his wage working hours5 at least once out
of the three interviews during the year. I choose white males, ages 18-65, who are employed
in the first year as the main sample to avoid any complication associated with labor market
participation and retirement issues. I drop individuals without information on household net
worth and individuals with household net worth above 10 million USD.6 I also drop individuals
with no information on years of education or no information on wage earnings in the second
period.
To make earnings a yearly measure, I conduct the following imputation. First, I consider
the monthly earnings during the interview month as the monthly earnings representing the
wave, because little variation is present in monthly earnings within the same wave. Suppose a
respondent reported earnings for only two waves and the total amount of earnings was $5,000.
I then calculate the annual earnings for that respondent as $5, 000 × 12
2
. For those who did
not report business earnings in the first year of operating a business, I impute the business
earnings by using the subsequent year’s business earnings if they are available.
5This definition is to differentiate an active business owner from a casual business owner.
6All the money values in this paper are normalized by 1 USD in 2011 unless otherwise indicated.
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2.2 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of the sample are reported in Table 1. Of 41,805 workers in the final
sample, about 2.2% started a business in the subsequent year. The mean of startup owners’
household-level net worth before they start a business is greater than that of the non-entrants.
As is well documented in the literature (e.g., Hamilton [2000]), the mean of startup owners’
first-year earnings are less than the mean of wage earnings by those who remain as workers.
Regarding years of education, years of experience, and marital status, the groups are similar
to each other. Table 2 further shows the initial wealth distribution for workers and startup
owners. The wealth distribution of startup owners is more dispersed than that of individuals
who remain as workers. In particular, 14.18% of startup owners started a business with negative
wealth.
Table 3 reports results from probit regressions for business entry similar to Hurst and
Lusardi [2004]. In the first equation, I include a polynomial of five degrees for net worth
among covariates. In the second equation, I instead include two dummies, one indicating
individuals whose net worth is between the 80th and 95th percentiles, and the other indicating
individuals whose net worth is above the 95th percentile. The predicted probabilities by two
probit analyses are shown in Figure 2. As in Hurst and Lusardi [2004], the positive relationship
between net worth and the probability of business entry is most distinctively observed among
those whose net worth is above the 95th percentile of the wealth distribution. On the other
hand, the increase in the probability of business entry over the wealth distribution up to the
80th percentile is relatively small. In particular, the predicted probability of business entry
among individuals with negative net worth is similar to that of individuals with positive net
worth and whose wealth distribution is below the 80th percentile.
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Table 4 shows the summary statistics for startup owners with negative net worth. Their
observable characteristics, including wage earnings in the first period, years of experience, and
years of education, are similar to those for startup owners with positive and below-median net
worth. On the other hand, the mean and median of business earnings for startup owners with
negative net worth are greater than for startup owners with positive and below-median net
worth.
2.3 Financing through Credit Borrowing
In this section, I first describe a broad picture of credit borrowing among startup owners by
using the KFS and SBCS. Then I provide evidence that the negative-wealth owners in the
SIPP primarily rely on credit borrowing to start a business.
The SIPP does not provide the source of startup financing. To understand how individuals
without net worth could finance the initial investment, I first refer to the KFS, a longitudinal
survey for 4,928 US businesses started in 2004. The survey asks about the source of startup
financing in great detail.7 One observation from the KFS is that not many startup owners use
credit card debt to finance the initial investment. For example, only 25% of startup owners used
personal credit card debt for startup financing.8 However, for those who use credit card debt,
the average amount is not trivial. For example, Table 5 shows the mean personal/business
credit card balances for startup owners. The overall average credit card balance for those who
use them is 38,725 USD in 2004.
7Information about initial financing is not available in the publicly available KFS data. Instead, I refer to
Robb and Robinson [2014], who comprehensively summarize the pattern of the initial financing for startup
firms in the KFS data.
8Robb and Robinson [2014], p. 13.
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The SBCS, a survey conducted by seven US Federal Reserve Banks,9 also provides in-
formation about unsecured borrowing among small firms. The survey is designed to collect
information about business performance, financing needs and choices, and borrowing experi-
ences of firms with fewer than 500 employees. In particular, the survey conducted in 2015
provides the proportion of firms that used unsecured debt for financing. Of the 2,250 sur-
veyed firms, 16% report usage of unsecured debt. If we condition on firms whose revenue size
is smaller than 100,000 USD in 2015, the proportion of businesses that used unsecured debt
increases to 30%.
Even though the SIPP does not provide the source of startup financing, we can observe the
changes in unsecured debt in one year in which some of the respondents start a business. Table
6 shows the regression estimates for the changes in unsecured debt. For those who started a
business with negative net worth, unsecured debt on average increased 23,391 USD more than
the population. By contrast, the change in unsecured debt for startup owners with positive
net worth is not significantly different from the change in unsecured debt for the population.10
This finding is consistent with the results from the KFS discussed above: few startup owners
use unsecured debt for financing, but for those who do, the amount of unsecured debt is not
trivial. Based on the result in Table 6, those who rely on credit borrowing are more likely to
be those whose net worth is limited.
9The Federal Reserve Banks [2015]
10The measure should be interpreted with caution because the changes in unsecured debt before and after
the start of a business may not reflect the actual amount of debt used for financing the business. For example,
the initial unsecured debt may already reflect the borrowing from a bank. Likewise, the unsecured debt after
the start of a business may reflect a repayment to the bank.
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3 The Model
Many models with financial constraints, for example Evans and Jovanovic [1989], cannot ra-
tionalize the behavior of the individuals who start a business without net worth. In those
models, the amount of borrowing is limited to a proportion of household net worth, and some-
one without positive net worth cannot borrow and hence cannot start a business. However, as
shown in section 2, about 14% of business entrants started a business with negative net worth.
To rationalize their behaviors, I modify Evans and Jovanovic [1989] to allow individuals with
negative net worth to start a business through credit borrowing. I first briefly describe Evans
and Jovanovic [1989] and discuss the component I augment.
3.1 Basic Setup
The model is a static occupational choice model between a worker and a business owner with
borrowing constraints. Every agent is a worker in the first period. Before the beginning of the
second period, each agent draws a business idea. Depending on the quality of the business idea
and the availability of funding, each agent decides whether to start a business in the second
period.
Utility is linear in consumption. The following equations determine wage earnings and
business earnings:11
w = θww (1)
y =
{
θsk
α − rk}s. (2)
11To make the model consistent with the data, I allow a random shock on the profit rather than the output.
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θw represents worker productivity. θs represents the quality of the business idea or the en-
trepreneurial productivity. The production technology is decreasing returns to scale with
respect to capital k. r is the gross risk-free interest rate. s represents a random shock to
business earnings. Likewise, w is a random shock to wage earnings. s and s are realized
after the capital investment and the occupational choice. The expectation over w and s are
both equal to one.
The financial market exhibits a friction in the forms of collateral constraints. Independent
of the quality of the business idea, the maximum amount of borrowing is limited to (λ− 1)A,
where λ is greater than 1 and A is the household net worth. Therefore, the total amount of
capital investment is limited to A+ (λ− 1)A = λA.
Under this environment, an agent becomes a business owner if and only if
max
k∈[0,λA]
E
[(
θsk
α − rk)s] > E[w].
An implication of this equation is that even if an agent’s business idea is superb, the agent
will not be able to start a business if his net worth is relatively small. Another implication is
that agents with negative household net worth cannot start a business, which contradicts the
data observation discussed in section 2. To address this issue, I incorporate credit borrowing
into the financial market in Evans and Jovanovic [1989].
3.2 Credit Borrowing
The environment under which unsecured credit arises has been developed to understand con-
sumer credit (e.g., Chatterjee et al. [2007]) and foreign debt (e.g., Arellano [2008]).12 In such
12Akyol and Kartik [2011] use a similar setup to study the relationship between the US bankruptcy laws and
the cost of credit borrowing for entrepreneurs.
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models, the fact that borrowers can default conditional on the realization of a shock makes the
interest rate higher than the risk-free rate. Moreover, the interest rate for unsecured credit
monotonically increases as amount of unsecured borrowing increases. Based on this theoretical
result, I parsimoniously model unsecured credit in the following way.13
Agents are now allowed to borrow more than λA, but they have to pay an interest premium
for the amount of loans exceeding λA. Moreover, the premium for the credit borrowing f is
an increasing function of the amount of unsecured credit x. That is,
f(0) = 0, f ′(x) ≥ 0, f ′(0) <∞.
The value function as a worker and as a business owner becomes
Vw(x1, x2) = θw
Vs(θ, A) =

θ
1
1−α
s
{(
α
r
) α
1−α − r
(
α
r
) 1
1−α
}
if λA ≥
(
αθs
r
) 1
1−α
maxk E
[{
θsk
α − rλA− (r + f(k − λA))(k − λA)}s] if λA < (αθsr ) 11−α
and the distribution of earnings for each occupation will be
Yw(x1, x2) = θww
Ys(θ, A) =

θ
1
1−α
s
{(
α
r
) α
1−α − r
(
α
r
) 1
1−α
}
s if λA ≥
(
αθs
r
) 1
1−α
{
θskˆ
α − rλA− (r + f(kˆ − λA))(kˆ − λA)}s, if λA < (αθsr ) 11−α
13A moral hazard problem between a lender and an entrepreneur can also increase the interest rate for credit
borrowing more than the risk-free interest rate (e.g., Paulson et al. [2006]).
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where kˆ is the optimal investment under financial constraints. The existence and the unique-
ness of kˆ are discussed in Appendix A. Under this circumstance, agents with negative net
worth (A ≤ 0) can start a business if the quality of the business idea is high enough.
4 Estimation
4.1 Specification
Before estimation, I first specify worker productivity (θw), the wage-earning shock (w), en-
trepreneurial productivity (θs), the business-earning shock (s), and the credit-borrowing pre-
mium (f).
4.1.1 Specification for {θw, w, θs, s}
The specification is similar to Evans and Jovanovic [1989] and Paulson et al. [2006]. Worker
productivity is a function of the years of education and experience.14 I also allow wage pro-
ductivity to depend on the marital status given that the wage earnings for married indi-
viduals are significantly higher than for single individuals in the sample. Specifically, θw =
µ0 + µ1 lnx1 + µ2 lnx2 + µ3IM , where x1, x2, IM are years of education, years of experience,
and the dummy variable indicating married individuals, respectively. w is assumed to be a
log-normal distribution with mean equal to 1 (E[w] = 1) as specified in equation (1).15 As a
result, the wage equation is
lnw = µ0 + µ1 lnx1 + µ2 lnx2 + µ3IM + ln w. (3)
14Experience is calculated as age minus years of education.
15Therefore, ln w follows the normal distribution of mean −σ2w/2 and variance σ2w.
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The log value of the entrepreneurial productivity is assumed to follow a normal distribution:
ln θs = β0 + β1 lnA+ β2 lnx1 + β3 lnx2 + η, (4)
where η ∼ N(0, σ2η). A higher level of assets may reflect higher entrepreneurial productivity.
Or the correlation between the propensity to become a business owner and net worth may re-
flect individuals’ different preferences (e.g., Hamilton [2000], Cressy [2000], Hurst and Lusardi
[2004], Hurst and Pugsley [2011], Nanda [2010], Akyol and Kartik [2011]). Instead of explic-
itly modelling such cases, I allow household net worth to be correlated with entrepreneurial
productivity. I also allow entrepreneurial productivity to be correlated with years of education
and experience. η is independent of the wage and business-earning shocks.
I normalize one unit of monetary value as 10,000 USD in 2011.16 Equation (4) includes the
log value of net worth, and I assume the entrepreneurial productivity is on average the same
for individuals with less than 10,000 USD. Therefore, β1, the coefficient for lnA in equation
(4), captures the percentage gains in productivity as the net worth increases from 10,000 USD.
The distribution of business earnings looks similar to a log normal distribution, but with
a possible realization of negative earnings. The specification for s captures these features:
s = ˜s − Ps, log ˜s ∼ N(µs, σ2s), E[s] = 1,
where Ps is a positive constant. Note that Ps governs the proportion of business owners with
negative earning.
Finally, I set the risk-free gross interest rate, r, as 1.1 following the literature (e.g., Evans
and Jovanovic [1989], Xu [1998], Paulson et al. [2006]).
16Evans and Jovanovic [1989] use 1,000 USD in 1976 as one unit of monetary value.
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4.1.2 Specification for the credit-borrowing premium
Based on the theoretical prediction, I assumed f to be an increasing function of the amount of
credit borrowing with f(0) = 0 and f ′(0) <∞. Identifying the exact shape of f is not feasible.
I impose a functional form assumption on f with respect to the amount of credit borrowing.
In doing so, I implement three different types of specifications, and compare the results:
f(x) = (1) γx
= (2)
γx
1 + γx
= (3) exp(γx)− 1,
where γ ≥ 0 and x is the amount of credit borrowing.
The above specifications share three common properties. First, they are increasing with
respect to x for any γ. Second, γ is equal to zero means no interest premium is associated with
credit borrowing, and the model collapses to Evans and Jovanovic [1989] without collateral
constraints. Third, if γ goes to infinity, the model converges to Evans and Jovanovic [1989]
with collateral constraints. The key difference is their first derivative with respect to x. It is
constant in the first specification, decreasing in the second specification and increasing in the
third specification. I present the first specification as the main result. The results from the
other two specifications are presented in Appendix B.
4.2 Identification
The model is fully characterized by parameters for the wage equation {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, σw},
parameters for the business earnings {β0, β1, β2, β3, ση, σs}, parameters for financial constraints
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{λ, γ}, and the degree of returns to capital α.17
For identification, I exploit the following idea. The effect of financial constraints can be
different across the wealth distribution. For example, agents in the lower percentile of the
wealth distribution are more likely to be affected by financial constraints than agents in the
upper percentile of the wealth distribution. If an agent’s net worth is large enough, he may
not be financially constrained, and the primary reason for him to become a business owner is
the productivity gains. Therefore, the occupational choice and the business earnings for those
wealthy agents can be informative of the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity.18
Given the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity, only two financial-constraint param-
eters influence the probability of starting a business for financially constrained agents: one for
the credit-borrowing premium (γ), and the other for the collateral constraint (λ). In par-
ticular, the occupational choice of individuals with negative net worth can be informative in
pinning down γ, because they are not eligible for collateral borrowing. Once γ is identified,
the occupational choice of individuals with positive but small amount of net worth can be
informative in determining λ.
Now, I formally address the above argument. I first show how other parameters can be
identified given α, and later discuss the identification of α. To begin with, the coefficient
governing the wage earnings, {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, σw}, can be identified by the linear regression
of log wage earnings, because the wage-earning shock (w) is independent of the unobserved
entrepreneurial productivity (η).
To identify the parameters for the entrepreneurial productivity distribution, {β0, β1, β2, β3,
17For expositional convenience, I normalized Ps as zero.
18This argument is similar to that of the identification at infinity (e.g., French and Taber [2011]).
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ση}, and the random shock to business earnings, (σs), I impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
1− α > β1
Assumption 1 says productivity can be allowed to increase positively with respect to net
worth, but the rate of increase cannot be so large to identify the model. As shown in section 3,
an individual is not financially constrained if and only if
(
αθs
r
) 1
1−α
< λA. With the specification
for θ in equation (4), this condition is equivalent to
η < −β0 − ln
(α
r
)
+ (1− α) lnλ+ (1− α− β1) lnA− β2 lnx1 − β3 lnx2. (5)
Therefore, under Assumption 1,
lim
A→∞
P(an individual is not financially constrained) = 1. (6)
Equation (6) says that, for any (x1, x2), the measure of financially unconstrained agents goes
to 1 as A increases. I first show the occupational choice and the first moment of log business
earnings for individuals with high wealth, and hence a lower likelihood of being financially
constrained, identify {β0, β1, β2, β3, ση, σs}.
Individuals who are not financially constrained start a business if and only if a0θ
1
1−α
s ≥ θw,
where a0 =
(
α
r
) α
1−α − r
(
α
r
) 1
1−α
. With the specification for θw and θs, this condition can be
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written as
η
ση
>
−β0 + (1− α)(lnµ0 − ln a0)
ση
− β1
ση
lnA+
(1− α)µ1 − β2
ση
lnx1
+
(1− α)µ2 − β3
ση
lnx2 +
(1− α)µ3
ση
IM . (7)
Denote the right-hand side of equation (7) as GX. G = [G0, G1, G2, G3, G4] and X =
[1, lnA, lnx1, lnx2, IM ]′, where
G0 =
−β0 + (1− α)(lnµ0 − ln a0)
ση
(8)
G1 = −β1
ση
(9)
G2 =
(1− α)µ1 − β2
ση
(10)
G3 =
(1− α)µ2 − β3
ση
(11)
G4 =
(1− α)µ3
ση
. (12)
Note that η
ση
follows the standard normal distribution, and therefore the probability financially
unconstrained individuals becoming business owners is
1− Φ(GX),
where Φ is CDF for the standard normal distribution. Therefore, G can be identified by the
occupational choice of individuals with high wealth.
The first moment of log business earnings for this financially unconstrained group can be
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represented as
E
[
lnpi|start a business] = E[ ln a0 + ln θ
1− α + ln s
∣∣start a business]
= ln a0 +
β0
1− α −
σ2s
2
+
β1
1− α lnA+
β2
1− α lnx1 +
β3
1− α lnx2
+
ση
1− αE
[ η
ση
∣∣ η
ση
≥ GX].
Denote
H0 = ln a0 +
β0
1− α −
σ2s
2
(13)
H1 =
β1
1− α (14)
H2 =
β2
1− α (15)
H3 =
β3
1− α (16)
h =
ση
1− α, (17)
and H = {H0, H1, H2, H3}. Note that E
[
η
ση
∣∣ η
ση
≥ GX] is the inverse-mills ratio for the
standard normal distribution. Given that G is identified by the occupational choice, E
[
η
ση
∣∣ η
ση
≥
GX
]
is a known object. Once this selection effect is controlled, the first moments for log
business earnings among individuals with high initial wealth can identify H and h.
To summarize, the occupational choice and the distribution of business earnings among rich
individuals identify G, H, and h. Given {α, µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3}, the parameters for entrepreneurial
productivity and the business-earning shock, {β0, β1, β2, β3, ση, σs}, are over-identified by equa-
tions (8) - (17).
With other parameters in hand, especially the parameters governing the distribution of θs,
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the parameter for credit borrowing γ can be identified by the occupational choice of individuals
with negative net worth. For expositional purposes, I will focus on the first specification of the
credit-borrowing premium f(k) = γk. The condition under which individuals with negative
net worth start a business can be represented as θskˆ
α − (r + γkˆ)kˆ ≥ θw, where kˆ is the
solution to max{k}
[
θsk
α − (r + γk)k]. Given a unique kˆ exists, as shown in Appendix A,
it can be easily shown that kˆ, and thus θskˆ
α − (r + γkˆ)kˆ, decreases as γ increases for any
θs. Therefore, Pr(start a business
∣∣A ≤ 0) = ∫ Pr(start a business∣∣A ≤ 0, θs)f(θs)dθs will
monotonically decrease as γ increases.
The collateral parameter λ can be identified by the occupational choice of individuals with
positive but low net worth. For financially constrained individuals with positive net worth to
start a business, the following condition should be satisfied: θsk¯
α− rλA− (r+ γ(k¯− λA)(k¯−
λA)
) ≥ θw, where k¯ is the solution to max{k} [θskα− rλA− (r+ γ(k− λA)(k− λA))]. Given
that all other parameters, including γ, are identified, only λ will govern this equation for
any θs as long as the agent is financially constrained. As λ increases, the agent can refinance
through collateral borrowing instead of credit borrowing, and hence the marginal cost of invest-
ment decreases. Therefore, Pr(start a business
∣∣A > 0, financially constrained) monotonically
increases as λ increases. As long as the measure of financially constrained agents is not zero at
the positive A, Pr(start a business
∣∣A > 0) = ∫ Pr(start a business∣∣A > 0, θs)f(θs)dθs will also
monotonically increase as λ increases. Given that the proportion of financially constrained
agents is more likely to be higher among a low-wealth group,
∫ A¯
0
Pr(business owner
∣∣0 < A <
A¯)g(A)d(A) can be used to identify λ, where A¯ is a low value of A and g is the empirical
distribution of initial net worth.
Finally, given all other parameters, the first moment of business earnings by startup owners
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with a small or negative net worth is an increasing function of α, and hence can be used to
identify α.
4.3 Estimation Procedure
The model is estimated in two steps. In the first step, {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, σw} is estimated by
the linear regression of wage earnings for those who remain as workers. In the second step,
the remaining parameters are estimated by the method of simulated moments. The moments
selection is based on the identification argument in section 4.2. All the targeted moments are
reported in Table 7. The number of moment conditions and the number of parameters are 15
and 10, respectively.
I specify a high- and low-wealth group as follows. For the group who are less likely to be
financially constrained, and hence are informative in identifying the entrepreneurial productiv-
ity distribution, I choose individuals whose household net worth is between the 80th and 95th
percentiles. I exclude the individuals whose household net worth is above the 95th percentile,
because their likelihood of starting a business is distinctively different from that of the rest
of the population as shown in Table 3 and Figure 2. Hurst and Lusardi [2004] and Nanda
[2010] provide possible explanations for this fact such as the difference in risk aversion across
wealth distribution. Because the goal of the current model is to understand the behavior of
individuals with relatively low wealth, I do not explicitly model those explanations.
For the low-wealth group, I choose individuals whose net worth is positive and below
the 20th percentile.19 To identify Ps, I also include the proportion of business owners with
19The selection of the wealth cutoff is rather arbitrary, but the estimates marginally change with a different
set of cutoffs. For example, I specified individuals whose household net worth is between the 75th and 95th
percentiles as the high-wealth group. Likewise, I specified individuals whose net worth is positive and below
the 25th percentile as the low-wealth group. The model estimates are very similar in all cases.
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negative income as an additional moment. I choose the weighting matrix be a diagonal matrix
which contains the inverse of variances of the data moments. Asymptotic standard errors are
calculated following Gourieroux and Monfort [1996].
4.4 Model Fit
Table 7 shows the targeted and simulated moments. The model fit is reasonably good. Figure
3 shows the predicted probability of business entry with respect to net worth up to the 95th
percentile for the actual data and for a simulated data from the current model. The probability
predicted using the simulated data replicates the the probability predicted using the actual
data quite well. In particular, with credit borrowing, the model can generate no relationship
between the probability of business entry and net worth.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probability of business entry with respect to net worth for the
actual data and for a simulated data from the model corresponds to Evans and Jovanovic [1989].
After making γ equal to zero, I re-estimated the model with the identical moments except for
two moments related to business owners with negative wealth. With this re-estimated model, I
conduct the same exercise as in Figure 3. Without credit borrowing, the model fails to generate
the flat relationship between the probability of business entry and net worth. Specifically, the
model predicts a sharp and positive relationship among low-wealth individuals.
5 Results
5.1 Estimates
Table 8 shows the estimates and the standard errors of the model parameters. A 10% increase
in the years of education leads to a 10% increase in wage earnings. A 10% increase in the
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years of experience leads to a 2.5% increase in wage earnings. Married workers tend to earn
30% more than workers without spouses.
A slightly positive correlation between entrepreneurial productivity and net worth is esti-
mated. A 10% increase in net worth leads to a 0.6% increase in entrepreneurial productivity.
The impact of years of education and experience on entrepreneurial productivity is insignifi-
cant.
The collateral-constraint parameter λ is estimated as 1.155, meaning individuals can invest
with the risk-free interest rate up to 115.5% of their household net worth. The interest-
premium parameter γ is estimated as 0.1032, implying agents should pay a 1% additional
interest-rate premium to borrow 1,000 USD with credit. Likewise, to borrow 10,000 USD with
credit, agents should pay 10% additional interest rate premium.20
5.2 Measuring Inefficiency by Financial Constraints
To quantify the inefficiency driven by financial constraints, I compare the estimated model with
the benchmark economy in which every agent can freely borrow with the risk-free interest rate.
For comparison, I also report the same counterfactual analyses with the re-estimated model
that corresponds to Evans and Jovanovic [1989].
First, to measure the efficiency loss in the extensive margin, I calculate the optimal number
and the realized number of business entrants for each simulation and average them after 1,000
simulations. The result is shown in the first row in Table 9. Of the potential business owners in
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 15.34%
(
The realized business entrants
The optimal business entrants
× 100
)
cannot start a business,
whereas 1.44% of them cannot start a business in the current model. This finding suggests
20Note that one unit of monetary value is normalized as 10,000 USD in 2011.
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ignoring the availability of credit borrowing for potential business owners will substantially
overstate the efficiency loss from financial constraints in the extensive margin. This result is
also in line with the findings by Hurst and Lusardi [2004] and Kerr et al. [2015]. In the presence
of credit borrowing, a limited net worth may not be a major barrier to business entry.
Second, to measure the efficiency loss in the intensive margin, I calculate the optimal and
the realized investments by startup owners for each simulation and average them after 1,000
simulations. The second row in Table 9 reports the result. Of the optimal investments by
the entrants in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 7.69%
(
The realized investments by business entrants
The optimal investments by business entrants
× 100
)
are not realized, whereas 6.07% of the optimal investments by the entrants are not realized in
the current model. Unlike the efficiency loss in the extensive margin, the efficiency loss in the
intensive margin is large even if credit borrowing is allowed for potential business owners.
To understand the efficiency loss due to financial constraints in more detail, I plot the
efficiency loss in business entry by different wealth groups in Figure 5. The first wealth group
includes individuals whose household net worth is below the 10th percentile. The second
wealth group includes individuals whose household net worth is between the 10th and 20th
percentiles. The remaining wealth groups are similarly defined.21 Most of the discouraged po-
tential business owners, who would have become business owners without financial constraints,
are concentrated below the 20th percentile of net worth. In fact, most individuals with positive
net worth could successfully start a business.
Figure 6 plots the average entrepreneurial productivity for those who are able to start a
business conditional on each wealth group. The average entrepreneurial productivity of the
first wealth group is about 15% higher than that of the second wealth group. As shown in
21The 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, and 50th percentiles of net worth correspond to -4,805 USD, 5,460 USD, 21,349
USD, 49,146 USD, and 85,726 USD, respectively.
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Figure 5, many potential business owners in the first wealth group cannot start a business,
due to a high credit premium. Only those whose entrepreneurial productivity is high enough
to compensate for the high credit premium will start a business. As a result, the average
entrepreneurial productivity among business entrants from the first wealth group is higher
than for the second and the third wealth groups. Note that β1, which captures the correlation
between entrepreneurial productivity and net worth, is estimated to be positive. As a conse-
quence, average entrepreneurial productivity increases as the wealth level increases from the
second wealth group.
Finally, Figure 7 shows the efficiency loss in investment by the entrants conditional on each
wealth group. About 32% of the potential investment is not materialized in the first wealth
group, because their entrepreneurial productivity is relatively high as shown in Figure 6, and
their financing cost is the highest among all wealth groups. The efficiency loss in investment by
startup owners from the second group is also high, as much as 27% of the optimal investments.
The efficiency loss in the intensive margin decreases as the wealth level increases, but the loss
is relatively high compared to the loss in the extensive margin shown in Figure 5.
Overall, individuals who start a business once credit borrowing is available are those whose
business idea is of a high-enough quality to compensate high financing costs associated with
credit borrowing. As a consequence, they start a business with a sub-optimal amount of
investments, and the unrealized investments by those agents are considerable.
6 Conclusion
I document a substantial number of individuals in the United States start a business with
negative net worth. I provide some evidence that credit borrowing is the main source of
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financing for those individuals. To quantify the extent to which financial constraints hinder
business entry and investments by the entrants given that individuals can start a business using
credit borrowing, I present and structurally estimate a model of financial friction that allows
individuals without net worth to start a business through credit borrowing. The estimated
model generates no relationship between household wealth and the propensity for business
entry. Ignoring credit borrowing for potential business owners substantially overstates the
efficiency loss from financial constraints in business entry. However, the efficiency loss in
investment by the entrants is still large even if credit borrowing is allowed.
Even in the presence of collateral constraints, few potential business owners would be
constrained to start a business, because they can use credit borrowing. However, a high
cost associated with credit borrowing prevents startup owners, especially with low wealth,
from investing the optimal amount of capital. In this regard, financial constraints hinder
entrepreneurial activities, especially by limiting the capital investments by low-wealth startup
owners.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Workers Startup owners
Obs. 41,805 931
Net worth at 1st period $194,512 $249,419
Earnings $53,590 $44,034
Experience (Year) 20.07 19.63
Education (Year) 13.77 13.89
Married (%) 64.44 64.57
NOTE: This table reports summary statistics for workers and startup owners. Mean is reported unless otherwise
indicated. The survey weight is applied. The experience is calculated as age minus years of education. The
household-level net worth and the individual-level earnings are reported. All the money values are normalized
by 1 USD in 2011.
Table 2: Wealth Distribution
Workers Startup owners
10% $-4,754 $-6,816
15% $1,140 $598
25% $12,026 $8,632
50% $85,598 $93,141
75% $249,092 $302,898
90% $523,117 $727,148
Prop. of Neg. Wealth 13.16% 14.18%
NOTE: This table reports the wealth distribution in the first period for workers and startup owners. The unit
is 1 USD in 2011. Prop. of Neg. Wealth is the proportion of individuals with negative wealth in the first
period.
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Table 3: Probit Estimates for Starting a Business
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Starting a Business Starting a Business
Net worth/100,000 -0.00741
(0.00971)
(Net worth/100,000)2 0.00243***
(0.000924)
(Net worth/100,000)3 5.88e-06
(5.18e-05)
(Net worth/100,000)4 -2.54e-06
(1.63e-06)
(Net worth/100,000)5 2.48e-08*
(1.32e-08)
Q2 0.0254
(0.0393)
Q3 0.296***
(0.0527)
ln(Edu) 0.0278 0.0213
(0.0566) (0.0560)
ln(Exp) 0.0116 0.00954
(0.0170) (0.0169)
Married -0.000884 -0.00131
(0.0317) (0.0317)
Constant -2.186*** -2.171***
(0.158) (0.157)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 42,736 42,736
NOTE: This table reports estimates for probit regressions for the dummy variable indicating individuals who
start a business. Q2 is the dummy variable indicating individuals whose net worth is between the 80th and
95th percentiles in the first period. Q3 is the dummy variable indicating individuals whose net worth is above
the 95th percentile in the first period. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Startup Owners with Negative Net Worth
Startup owners
Net worth < 0 Net worth ∈ [0,median]
Obs. 127 311
Labor earnings (1st period) $33,461 $34,514
Experience (Year) 15.75 17.07
Education (Year) 13.64 12.88
Married (%) 55.54 60.65
Business earnings $36,665 $27,569
Business earnings (median) $21,520 $14,513
NOTE: This table reports summary statistics for characteristics of startup owners with negative net worth.
Mean is reported unless otherwise indicated. The survey weight is applied. Experience is calculated as age
minus years of education. For comparison, I also report the summary statistics for characteristics of startup
owners with positive and below-median net worth.
Table 5: Credit Card Financing in the Kauffman Firm Survey
Mean Mean if> 0
Personal credit card balance (A) $3,049 $16,790
Business credit card balance (B) $1,956 $21,935
(A) + (B) $5,005 $38,725
NOTE: This table reports the average amount of credit card debt for startup owners in the Kaufmann Firm
Survey. The number is calculated from Table 4 in Robb and Robinson [2014].
29
Table 6: Regression Estimates for Changes in Unsecured Debt
VARIABLES d(Unsecured debts)
Initial Unsecured debts -0.815***
(0.0121)
Startup owners (neg. wealth) 23,391**
(9,622)
Startup owners (pos. wealth) 4,192
(3,938)
Experience -117.8**
(48.96)
Education 863.0***
(204.1)
Married 1,290
(1,203)
Constant 522.3
(3,141)
Year dummies Yes
Observations 42,736
R-squared 0.096
NOTE: This table shows the regression estimates for the change in the amount of unsecured debt.
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Table 7: Model Fit for the 2nd-Step Estimation
Moments Data Model
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth) 0.0033 0.0033
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Ai 0.1601 0.1622
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Edui 0.0494 0.0444
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Expi 0.0790 0.0574
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× ln(yi) 0.0031 0.0036
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Ai × ln(yi) 0.1516 0.1719
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Edui × ln(yi) 0.0487 0.0493
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & high wealth)× Expi × ln(yi) 0.0742 0.0706
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & negative wealth) 0.0031 0.0025
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & negative wealth)× ln(yi) 0.0019 0.0017
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & low wealth) 0.0015 0.0020
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & low wealth)× ln(yi) 0.0003 0.0008
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(start a business & low wealth)× Ai × ln(yi) 0.0001 0.0002
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(negative yi) 0.0032 0.0032
var(ln(yi)) 0.0358 0.0395
NOTE: This table compares the actual and the simulated moments for the second-step estimation. I is an
indicator function. yi is the business earnings for startup owners. High wealth indicates an individual whose
household net worth is between the 80th and 95th percentiles. Low wealth indicates an individual whose
household net worth is positive and below the 20th percentile. A, Edu, and Exp refer to household net worth,
years of education, and years of experience, respectively.
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Table 8: Estimates for Model Parameters
Parameters Variables Estimates Standard Errors
Wage earning equation
µ0 Constant -2.0073 (0.0736)
µ1 ln(Education) 1.0415 (0.0064)
µ2 ln(Experience) 0.2572 (0.0029)
µ3 Married 0.3000 (0.0062)
σw Std. of log w 0.6901 (0.0028)
Business earning equation
β0 Constant -8.12e-06 (0.0751)
β1 ln(Net worth) 0.0615 (0.0114)
β2 ln(Education) 0.0002 (0.0638)
β3 ln(Experience) -4.08e-05 (0.0118)
ση Std. of η 0.6892 (0.0119)
σs Std. of log ˜s 0.6953 (0.0436)
Ps − 0.6078 (0.0264)
λ Collateral constraint 1.1550 (0.4050)
γ Interest premium 0.1032 (0.0375)
α Returns to capital 0.3222 (0.0333)
NOTE: This table presents the estimates for the model parameters. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses.
Table 9: Counterfactual Analysis: Efficiency Loss in Percentage
Efficiency loss in percentage
EJ(1989) Current model
Number of startup owners 15.34 1.44
Unrealized inv. by entrants 7.69 6.07
NOTE: The first row of the table shows the efficiency loss in business entry calculated by
(The realized business entrantsThe optimal business entrants × 100). The second row shows the efficiency loss in investment by the entrants
calculated by (The realized investments by business entrantsThe optimal investments by business entrants × 100).
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Figure 1: Time Trend of Mortgage/Credit Card Interest Rates
NOTE: This figure shows the time trend of mortgage/credit card interest rates. The mortgage rate is a 30-year
conventional mortgage rate, which is contract interest rates on commitments for fixed-rate first mortgages. The
credit card interest rate is the commercial bank interest rate on credit card plans. (Source: Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED))
Figure 2: Predicted Prob. of Business Entry with respect to Net Worth
NOTE: This figure shows the predicted probability of business entry based on the probit estimates in Table 3
(equation (1): blue line, equation (2): red line). The 80th percentile of net worth is 313,048 USD and the 95th
percentile of net worth is 772,828 USD.
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Figure 3: Predicted Prob. of Business Entry with Respect to Net Worth: Data vs. the Current
Model
NOTE: This figure compares the predicted probability of business entry with respect to net worth up to the
95th percentile for the actual data, and a simulated data from the current model.
Figure 4: Predicted Prob. of Business Entry with Respect to Net Worth: Data vs. Evans and
Jovanovic [1989]
NOTE: This figure compares the predicted probability of business entry with respect to net worth up to the
95th percentile for the actual data, and a simulated data from the model corresponds to Evans and Jovanovic
[1989].
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Figure 5: Percentage Loss in Business Entry Conditional on Net Worth
NOTE: This figure plots
(
The realized business entrants
The optimal business entrants × 100
)
conditional on each wealth group. The first wealth
group includes individuals whose household net worth is below the 10th percentile. The second wealth group
includes individuals whose household net worth is between the 10th and 20th percentiles. The remaining
wealth groups are similarly defined. The 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, and 50th percentiles of net worth correspond
to -4,805 USD, 5,460 USD, 21,349 USD, 49,146 USD, and 85,726 USD, respectively.
Figure 6: Average Entrepreneurial Productivity of the Entrants Cond. on Net Worth
NOTE: This figure shows the average entrepreneurial productivity by startup owners conditional on each
wealth group. The definition of wealth groups is identical to Figure 5. The value for the second wealth group
is normalized as 1.
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Figure 7: Percentage Loss in Investments by Startup Owners Cond. on Net Worth
NOTE: This figure plots
(
The realized investments by business entrants
The optimal investments by business entrants ×100
)
conditional on each wealth group. The
definition of wealth groups is identical to Figure 5.
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Appendix
A Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimal Investment
with Credit Borrowing
The optimal investment under credit borrowing kˆ is the solution to max{k}
[
θkα − rλA− (r+
f(k− λA))(k− λA)]. Without loss of generality, I will consider the case in which A = 0. The
first-order condition implies αθ
(
1
k
)1−α
− f(k)− f ′(k)k = r. Denote the left-hand side of this
equation as Ω(k). As long as f ′(0) is bounded above, limk→0 Ω(k) = ∞. On the other hand,
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given that f ′(k) is positive, limk→∞ f ′(k) = −∞. Therefore, kˆ exists. To show the uniqueness
of kˆ, it is sufficient to show Ω′(k) is negative for any positive k. This condition can be written
as
kf ′′(k) > −(1− α)θ
(1
k
)2−α
− 2f ′(k). (18)
All specifications for f(k) in section 4.1 satisfy equation (18).
B Comparing Results with Different Specifications of f
The results from the second and third specifications for the credit-borrowing premium in
section 4.1 are presented in this section. Table 10 compares the parameter estimates for
each specifications. The parameter estimates are similar across all specifications.22 Using the
estimates for each specification, I further investigate whether the main results presented in
section 5 hold with other specifications. Table 11 shows the results. The calculated efficiency
loss for both extensive and intensive margin rarely changes.
22Note the parameters for wage earnings {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, σw} are identical because they are estimated at the
first stage.
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Table 10: Estimates for Model Parameters (All Specifications)
f(x)
Baseline Spec. (2) Spec. (3)
Parameters γx γx
1+γx
exp(γx)− 1
µ0 -2.0073 -2.0073 -2.0073
µ1 1.0415 1.0415 1.0415
µ2 0.2572 0.2572 0.2572
µ3 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000
σw 0.6901 0.6901 0.6901
β0 -8.12e-06 -8.08e-06 -8.88e-06
β1 0.0615 0.0616 0.0615
β2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
β3 -4.08e-05 -5.17e-05 -4.76e-05
ση 0.6892 0.6892 0.6892
σs 0.6953 0.6953 0.6953
Ps 0.6078 0.6078 0.6078
λ 1.1550 1.0005 1.0138
γ 0.1032 0.1064 0.1074
α 0.3222 0.3254 0.3261
NOTE: This table presents the parameter estimates for each specification of the credit-borrowing premium.
Table 11: Efficiency Loss in Percentage (All Specifications)
Efficiency loss in percentage
EJ(1989) Baseline Spec. (2) Spec. (3)
Number of startup owners 15.34 1.44 1.44 1.46
Unrealized inv. by entrants 7.69 6.07 5.86 5.88
NOTE: The first row of the table shows the efficiency loss in business entry calculated by
(The realized business entrantsThe optimal business entrants × 100). The second row shows the efficiency loss in investment by the business
entrants calculated by (The realized investments by business entrantsThe optimal investments by business entrants × 100).
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